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FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 02/22/2019 05:02 PM INDEX NO. 151979/2019 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/22/2019 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK ----------------------------- ------------------------------------X SUMMONS DANIEL MINZER, Plaintiff designates New York Plaintiff, County as the place of Trial v. The basis of venue is Plaintiff's Residence ANGELO BARGA, ZWOLF-NY, LLC, and UBER Plaintiff resides at: TECHNOLOGIES, New York, NY Defendants. INDEX NO: --- --------------------------------------------X TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS: YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONDED to answer the complaint in this action and to serve a copy of your answer, or, if the Complaint is not served with this Summons, to serve a notice of appearance, on the Plaintiff's Attorney(s) within 20 days after the service of this Summons, exclusive of the date of service (or within 30 days after service is complete if this summons is not personally delivered to you within the State of New York); and in case of your failure to appear or answer, judgement will be taken against you by default for the relief demanded in the Complaiñt. Dated: New York, New York February 22, 2019 GITLIN, HORN, AND VAN DE KIEFT, LLP BY: _ MOSHE HORN Attorneys for Plaintiff 2095 Broadway, Suite 411 New York, New York 10023 (212) 514-5437 DEFENDANTS' ADDRESSES: UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. ZWOLF-NY, LLC ANGELO BARGA 1I1 Eighth Ave. 111 Eighth Ave. 94-49 133d AVE NY, NY 10011 NY, NY, 10011 Ozone Park, NY 11417 1 of 20 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 02/22/2019 05:02 PM INDEX NO. 151979/2019 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/22/2019 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK --------------------------------------------------------------------------X DANIEL MINZER, Plaintiff, VERIFIED COMPLAINT v. PLAINTIFF DEMANDS ANGELO BARGA, ZWOLF-NY, LLC, and UBER TRIAL BY JURY TECHNOLOGIES, INC. INDEX NO: ______________ Defendants. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------X The Plaintiff, Daniel Minzer, by and through his attorneys, Gitlin, Horn and Van de Kieft LLP, as for his Verified Complaint herein, respectfully sets forth and alleges upon information and belief as follows: PARTIES AND JURISDICTION 1. Plaintiff, Daniel Minzer, resides in New York County, New York. 2. On information and belief, Defendant Angelo Barga (“Mr. Barga”) resides in Queens County, New York and was previously a driver licensed by the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (“TLC”) under TLC License Number 5663529, but whose TLC license has since been suspended or revoked. 3. On information and belief Mr. Barga is, or was, affiliated with Zwolf-NY, LLC. 4. Mr. Barga is subject to personal jurisdiction in New York. 5. Defendant, Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”), is a Delaware Corporation with its principal place of business in San Francisco, California. Uber is registered to transact business in New York and is registered with the New York State Department of State Division of 2 of 20 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 02/22/2019 05:02 PM INDEX NO. 151979/2019 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/22/2019 Corporations, DOS ID #4622404. Uber has designated CT Corporation System, 111 Eighth Avenue, New York, New York, 10011 as its registered agent. 6. Uber operates throughout the United States, including New York, and it regularly conducts business in New York City, as evidenced by the following webpage for Uber’s business in New York City: https://www.uber.com/cities/new-york/. 7. Uber is subject to personal jurisdiction in New York. 8. Defendant, Zwolf-NY, LLC (“Zwolf”) is a Delaware Limited Liability Company. Zwolf is registered to transact business in New York and is registered with the New York State Department of State Division of Corporations, DOS ID #4784341. Zwolf’s principal place of business is in New York. Zwolf has designated CT Corporation System, 111 Eighth Avenue, New York, New York, 10011 as its registered agent. 9. Zwolf is a “Black Car” type TLC Licensed Base dispatcher operating under TLC License number B20877. 10. On information and belief, Zwolf operates as a TLC licensed dispatcher primarily, if not solely, for the purpose of employing Uber drivers in New York City as it is a requirement in NYC that Uber drivers and vehicles in NYC by TLC licensed. 11. Zwolf dispatched Mr. Braga on the night of the incident in question. 12. Zwolf is subject to personal jurisdiction in New York. 13. On information and belief, Zwolf is a mere alter ego or conduit by which Defendant Uber does business in New York City. Defendant Zwolf and Defendant Uber are referred to collectively as “Uber.” 14. At all times relevant to this action, Mr. Barga was an at-will employee of Uber acting in the course and within the scope of his employment as a driver for Uber. 2 3 of 20 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 02/22/2019 05:02 PM INDEX NO. 151979/2019 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/22/2019 15. Mr. Barga worked in the service of Uber under an express or implied contract of hire, under which Uber had the right and power to control Mr. Barga’s actions and the details of Mr. Barga’s work performance. 16. Uber recruited, selected, and engaged Mr. Barga. 17. Uber vetted Mr. Barga, requiring him to provide personal banking and residence information as well as his social security number, and to pass a background and DMV check. 18. Upon information and belief, as with other Uber drivers, Uber required Mr. Barga to sign a “Partnership Agreement.” 19. Upon information and belief, Uber gave Mr. Barga an Uber phone and assigned him a unique Driver ID. 20. Uber limited Mr. Barga’s ability to share the Uber phone or Uber Driver ID with anyone else. 21. In the performance of his duties, Mr. Barga followed detailed policies and procedures created, implemented, and constantly monitored for compliance by Uber. 22. Mr. Barga was expected to dress “professionally.” 23. Uber had the power to control almost every facet of Mr. Barga’s work and instructed Mr. Barga on how to pick up a customer with his car. 24. Uber expected Mr. Barga to accept all ride requests that came through the Uber system. Uber notified Mr. Barga that it considered “a dispatch that is not accepted to be a rejection.” Uber notified Mr. Barga that it considered rejecting too many trips to be “a performance issue that could lead to possible termination from the Uber platform.” 25. Uber established the means and methods for payment of a share of the fare to Mr. Barga. 3 4 of 20 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 02/22/2019 05:02 PM INDEX NO. 151979/2019 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/22/2019 26. Uber provided the software (i.e. the “app”) and the tools and equipment (i.e. “the Uber phone”) that facilitated all of Mr. Barga’s actions as an Uber driver. 27. But for Uber’s intellectual property and hardware, Mr. Barga would not have been able to work. Uber controlled the means and methods by which Mr. Barga located and interacted with ride-seekers like Plaintiff. 28. Uber had the absolute power to shut off Mr. Barga’s access to Uber’s application, and, in fact, Uber regularly terminates the accounts of drivers who do not perform up to Uber’s standards. 29. Uber controlled Mr. Barga’s vehicle to the extent that Uber could “de-activate” Mr. Barga from the service for failure to comply with Uber’s guidelines and standards. 30. Uber held Mr. Barga out as an employee and allowed Mr. Barga to hold himself out as an employee. 31. Uber held out Mr. Barga as competent and fit to be trusted. 32. Uber warranted Mr. Barga’s fidelity and good conduct as an Uber driver. 33. Uber had the power to dismiss Mr. Barga at will, in its sole discretion, and without cause. 34. The facts and circ*mstances of this action, as well as the parties’ conduct, demonstrate that Mr. Barga was an employee of Uber at the time of the assault and battery at issue. 35. Based upon the conduct described below, Plaintiff reasonably inferred and believed that Mr. Barga was acting under the authority of Uber. 4 5 of 20 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 02/22/2019 05:02 PM INDEX NO. 151979/2019 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/22/2019 VENUE 36. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to CPLR § 503, as Plaintiff is a resident of New York County and New York County is “the county in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” FACTS A. Background 37. Uber is a nationwide transportation service that connects riders and drivers through a smartphone application. A customer seeking a ride must download and log into the Uber “App”. The Uber application finds the rider via the smartphone’s GPS system. The rider than enters a destination, chooses a type of ride or vehicle, and then taps “Request” which alerts nearby Uber drivers that a ride has been requested. 38. Although Uber engineered a software method to connect drivers with passengers, this is merely one instrumentality used in the context of Uber’s larger business. Uber does not simply sell software; it sells rides. In fact, Uber’s own marketing bears this out, referring to Uber as “Everyone’s Private Driver,” and as a “transportation system.” 39. Uber chooses what information to provide to their drivers and when to provide it. Uber typically does not disclose the rider’s destination until the ride begins. 40. App users must pay Uber for the ride with a credit card authorized through the App. Uber establishes the rate for a given ride (rates are variable depending on demand levels, promotional deals, and other factors), collects the fare, pays the driver a share of the fare collected, and retains the remainder. 41. To provide rides quickly and efficiently, Uber’s business model requires a large pool of drivers. To accomplish this, Uber solicits and retains tens of thousands of non-professional 5 6 of 20 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 02/22/2019 05:02 PM INDEX NO. 151979/2019 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/22/2019 drivers. After these drivers are hired by Uber, Uber makes the drivers available to the public to provide transportation services through its App. 42. Uber provides auto insurance for drivers that do not maintain sufficient insurance on their own. Insurance provided by Uber covers incidents occurring while a driver is connected online with the Uber App, with coverage increasing when a rider is in the vehicle. B. Uber’s False Representations of Safety 43. For the consumer, the experience is supposed to be easy and completed through the Uber software. Despite its representations, advertising, and promotional materials, Uber cannot assure riders of the safety of the driver behind the wheel. 44. Uber has, and continues to, knowingly mislead the public about the safety and security measures it employs for rider safety. 45. Riders, including Plaintiff, reasonably relied on Uber’s representations and promises about its safety, screening, training and security measures prior to utilizing the Uber App and/or getting into a vehicle operated by an Uber driver. 46. Uber’s business model is contingent on convincing its customers it is safe to get into a stranger’s vehicle. To do this, Uber makes a number of representations on its webpages, in communications with customers, and in the media, designed to create the impression that Uber provides what Uber characterizes as the “safest rides on the road.” 47. Examples of misrepresentations made to, and relied upon by consumers, including Plaintiff, are as follows: a. “All Uber [drivers] must go through a rigorous background check that leads the industry;” 6 7 of 20 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 02/22/2019 05:02 PM INDEX NO. 151979/2019 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/22/2019 b. “The Safe Rides Fee supports an industry-leading background check process;” c. “Uber has Background Checks that Exceed any Local or National Standard;” d. “Uber’s background check process is often more rigorous than what is required to become a taxi driver;” e. “Uber’s safety measures always exceed what is required of local taxi companies;” f. “Uber’s background checks go back as far as the law allows;” 48. Uber created a website in 2014, dedicated to touting the safety of riding with Uber. Uber used and continues to use the URL: www.uber.com/safety. 49. Uber thus misleads its consumers into believing that a ride in an Uber vehicle is not just safe, but the safest, or safer than other ridesharing companies and safer than taxis. According to Uber, this is because Uber adheres to “industry-leading” and the “strictest standards possible” regarding safety, vetting, screening, and background checks. 50. These statements are false, as Uber’s screening process is neither the strictest nor industry-leading. C. Uber’s Drivers 51. Uber’s revenues do not depend on the distribution of its software, but on the generation of rides by its drivers. As noted above and below, Uber bills its riders directly for the entire amount of the fare charged – a fare amount that is set by Uber without any input from its drivers. Put simply, Uber only makes a profit if its drivers actually transport passengers. 52. Uber’s drivers are employees, special agents, and/or partners of Uber. 7 8 of 20 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 02/22/2019 05:02 PM INDEX NO. 151979/2019 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/22/2019 53. Uber solicits the drivers, who are required to submit an application to Uber, which is reviewed and approved by Uber. 54. According to Uber, every driver is thoroughly screened by Uber through a rigorous process developed and controlled by Uber using Uber’s safety standards. 55. Every driver has to submit to a background check. Uber notes that background checks are important because it only wants “to partner with the safest drivers.” 56. Uber maintains driver rules, requirements, policies and expectations, as well as evaluations, feedback and suggestions. 57. Uber provides is drivers with the network of riders and the training and tools to find and connect to those riders. 58. Though its proprietary app, Uber arranges the specific car service provided by its drivers and connects the driver to the rider. 59. Uber calculates the fares and whether and how tips are factored into fares. 60. Uber accepts and controls the means and methods of payment for the ride. 61. Uber receives a percentage of each and every fare its drivers labor to earn. 62. Upon information and belief, Uber and its drivers split the profit, 80/20, with twenty-percent of the profit being retained by Uber. 63. Uber pays its drivers for services rendered. 64. Uber has hundreds of managers in cities throughout the world, who ultimately have the power to control the Uber drivers through various means, including Uber’s reward/disciplinary system of rating drivers and Uber’s ultimate authority to “deactivate,” i.e. terminate, drivers. 65. As the Uber Driver Handbook states, “Uber follows up on all client reports of dissatisfaction” and “monitors your star rating as well as any complaints made by clients.” 8 9 of 20 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 02/22/2019 05:02 PM INDEX NO. 151979/2019 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/22/2019 66. Uber engages in persistent performance monitoring of its drivers. 67. Uber does, in fact, terminate drivers who star ratings fall below a certain threshold determined by Uber. 68. As expressly disclosed on Uber’s website, Uber’s managers manage both the deployment and quality of Uber’s supply chain (i.e. Uber’s “driver partners”), which is essential to the success of Uber’s business model. 69. The services provided by Uber’s drivers are fully-integrated into Uber’s business of providing transportation service to riders. 70. Uber keeps and maintains all operational and financial records for all rides. 71. Uber and its drivers are true partners in every ride. D. The Incidents of February 24, 2018 72. Mr. Barga’s work was integral to Uber’s business. Uber is in business to provide transpiration services to passengers, and profits from providing those transportation services. Mr. Barga did the actual transportation service for Uber. Without drivers such as Mr. Barga, Uber’s business would not exist. 73. Mr. Barga’s willful and malicious acts (described below) were committed while Mr. Barga was performing his duties as Uber’s employee driver and in execution of the services for which Mr. Barga was employed. 74. Mr. Barga’s tortious acts arose out of an argument connected to the operation of an Uber transportation vehicle being operated by Mr. Barga. 75. Mr. Barga’s acts were incident to, and facilitated by, his employment as an Uber driver. 9 10 of 20 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 02/22/2019 05:02 PM INDEX NO. 151979/2019 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/22/2019 76. On February 24, 2018, Plaintiff was at or near 200 West 70th Street between West End Avenue and Amsterdam Avenue in Manhattan when he requested a ride using the Uber app. 77. On February 24, 2018, Plaintiff was waiting for his Uber ride with a friend of his. 78. Plaintiff’s friend had a broken knee on the day of the incident, and because of this broken knee Plaintiff’s friend was wearing a brace and using crutches at the time. 79. On February 24, 2018, Plaintiff’s assigned Uber driver, Mr. Barga, arrived at the Plaintiff’s location and Plaintiff’s friend got in the front passenger seat of the Uber vehicle. 80. After the Uber vehicle arrived, Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s friend got into the Uber Vehicle. 81. Upon getting in the Uber vehicle, Plaintiff requested that Defendant Barga make two separate stops for the two passengers. 82. Mr. Barga became agitated at the request for two stops and began to argue with Plaintiff. 83. Mr. Braga informed the Plaintiff that he would not make two stops, and an argument ensued. 84. During the argument, Mr. Barga threatened Plaintiff with charging him an Uber cancellation fee. 85. Plaintiff informed Mr. Barga that he would not pay an Uber cancellation fee. 86. During the argument, Mr. Barga, threatened the Plaintiff with a statement to the effect of “do you want to have a broken leg like your friend,” which Plaintiff believed was a threat to injure Plaintiff referring to his friend’s broken knee and crutches and brace. 87. Mr. Barga exited the vehicle, walked to the back of the car, and punched Plaintiff on the right side of his face. 10 11 of 20 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 02/22/2019 05:02 PM INDEX NO. 151979/2019 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/22/2019 88. Mr. Barga’s punch of Plaintiff resulted in serious injuries. Plaintiff suffered multiple broken bones from this punch, including a facture of Plaintiff’s jaw bone. 89. After punching Plaintiff, Mr. Barga returned to the driver seat of his vehicle and drove away from the scene. 90. Shortly after, Plaintiff received an email receipt from Uber that he was charged $10.40 for a ride with Mr. Barga from 200 West 70th Street, New York, NY to 287B Amsterdam Avenue, New York, NY. The Uber receipt reported the pickup as occurring at 11:12 p.m. and drop off as occurring at 11:15 p.m. Neither Plaintiff, nor his friend, ever participated in said trip following the attack by Mr. Barga. 91. Plaintiff was humiliated and embarrassed by the undignified attacks. 92. Plaintiff went to the hospital, where he received treatment for his serious injuries. 93. Plaintiff has already undergone one surgery as a result of Plaintiff’s injuries, and Plaintiff may require further surgery and/or braces to correct complications resulting from the jaw bone fracture. 94. As a direct and proximate result of the assault and battery, Plaintiff incurred medical expenses. 95. Plaintiff reported the assault and battery by Mr. Barga to Uber, as well as the trip he was charged for that he did not take. 96. Uber refunded plaintiff the $10.40 charged to Plaintiff on or about February 26, 2018. 97. On March 15, 2018, Defendant Braga was arrested and charged with Assault. 11 12 of 20 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 02/22/2019 05:02 PM INDEX NO. 151979/2019 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/22/2019 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: ASSAULT 98. Plaintiff alleges and reasserts all of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 99. Mr. Barga’s acts on February 24, 2018, described above, intended to cause either harmful or offensive contact with Plaintiff or apprehension of such contact. Mr. Braga’s acts were motivated by personal hatred, spite, ill will, and malice towards Plaintiff. 100. Mr. Barga’s actions created in Plaintiff’s mind a reasonable apprehension of an imminent battery. 101. Mr. Barga’s actions constitute civil assault. 102. As a direct result of Mr. Barga’s assault, Plaintiff suffered damage and incurred loss, including but not limited to, pain and suffering, severe emotional trauma, fight, apprehension, anguish, stress and anxiety, public ridicule, humiliation, embarrassment, feelings of insecurity and helplessness, costs, attorney’s fees, and other out-of-pocket expenses in an amount to be determined by the jury. 103. Uber is liable for Mr. Braga’s actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior and, as a partner with Mr. Braga, Uber is liable for Mr. Braga’s actions. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: BATTERY 104. Plaintiff alleges and reasserts all of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 105. Mr. Braga’s acts on February 24, 2018, described above, were unwanted by Plaintiff and were neither consented to, excused, nor justified. Mr. Braga’s acts were motivated by personal hatred, spite, ill will, and malice towards Plaintiff. 106. Mr. Braga’s actions constitute the tort of battery. 12 13 of 20 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 02/22/2019 05:02 PM INDEX NO. 151979/2019 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/22/2019 107. As a direct result of Mr. Braga’s battery, Plaintiff suffered damage and incurred loss, including, but not limited to, physical injuries, severe emotional trauma, fright, apprehension, anguish, stress and anxiety, public ridicule, humiliation, embarrassment, feelings of insecurity and helplessness, costs, attorney’s fees, and other out-of-pocket expenses in an amount to be determined by the jury. 108. Uber is liable for Mr. Braga’s actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior and, as a partner with Mr. Braga, Uber is liable for Mr. Braga’s actions. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR 109. Plaintiff re-alleges and reasserts all of the proceeding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 110. At all times relevant to this complaint, Defendant Barga was an employee of Defendant Uber. 111. Defendant Barga was engaged in a driving assignment for Uber, for the benefit of Uber. 112. In carrying out the aforementioned assault and battery against Plaintiff, Barga was acting within the scope of his employment. 113. As a result of Defendant Barga’s assault and battery of Plaintiff, Plaintiff has been damaged, and under the principle of respondeat superior, Uber is liable for Plaintiff’s injuries. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION: NEGLIGENT HIRING, SUPERVISION AND RETENTION 114. Plaintiff alleges and reasserts all of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 115. Uber owed Plaintiff and the general public a duty of reasonable care in the hiring, training, and supervision of its drivers. 13 14 of 20 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 02/22/2019 05:02 PM INDEX NO. 151979/2019 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/22/2019 116. At all times relevant hereto, as a provider of transportation and according to Uber’s own policies, Defendant Uber owed a duty to consumers, including Plaintiff, to retain or employ a driver that was adequately skilled, trained, and experienced in providing transportation. 117. Uber owed a duty to consumers to retain or employ a driver that was adequately educated, skilled, trained, and/or experienced in addressing complaints or disputes with, between, or among riders and drivers. 118. Defendant Uber breached the duties owed as set forth in the preceding paragraphs, including but not limited to the following breaches: a. by failing to select, retain, and/or hire personnel properly qualified to operate Uber vehicles in a safe and reasonable manner; b. by failing to properly screen potential drivers, including Defendant Barga, before retaining or hiring him; c. by selecting, retaining or hiring Defendant Barga without fully investigating his background; d. by failing to abide by proper screening protocols before selecting, retaining, and/or hiring agents and/or employees, including Defendant Barga; e. by hiring potentially dangerous drivers such as Defendant Barga; f. by failing to provide follow-up safety screening, including for Defendant Barga; g. by failing to properly supervise drivers, including Defendant Barga, while such drivers are operating Uber vehicles; and 14 15 of 20 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 02/22/2019 05:02 PM INDEX NO. 151979/2019 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/22/2019 h. by failing to train drivers, including Defendant Barga, on how to address disputes regarding transportation and a consumer’s desired destination. 119. Barga was unfit and incompetent to perform the work for which he was hired. 120. Uber knew or should have known that Barga was unfit and incompetent and that this unfitness and incompetence created a particular risk to others. 121. Barga’s unfitness and incompetence harmed Plaintiff, and Uber’s negligence in hiring, supervising, and retaining Barga was a substantial factor in causing the harm. 122. Uber’s negligence in hiring, supervising, and retaining Barga was perpetrated with fraud, oppression, and/or malice, and was in conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others, including Plaintiff, such as to warrant the imposition of punitive damages pursuant to New York law. FIFTH CASE OF ACTION: FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION 123. Plaintiff alleges and reasserts all of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 124. Uber made false representations and false promises that harmed Plaintiff. 125. Uber falsely represented to Plaintiff that its drivers were properly screened and were safe. Uber represented that it was better and safer than a taxi or public transit. Uber promised Plaintiff the safest ride possible. 126. Uber falsely represented to Plaintiff that its rides were safe and that its drivers were safe. 127. Uber knew that these representations were false and intended for customers like Plaintiff to rely on them. 15 16 of 20 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 02/22/2019 05:02 PM INDEX NO. 151979/2019 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/22/2019 128. Uber knew that its security screening was deficient, that its background checks were below industry standards, and that its drivers were not trained or supervised. 129. Uber knew that they did not train their drivers in customer service as to deal with foreseeable customer service disputes, such as the dispute about two stops alleged in this complaint. 130. Uber intentionally concealed these facts, and deliberately represented the opposite – that its drivers offered the safest options for travel. 131. Plaintiff reasonably relied on Uber’s representations in riding with Barga, and his reliance on Uber’s misrepresentations were a substantial factor in causing his harm. If he had known the facts Uber concealed about its service, its security screening and its drivers, he would not have accepted a ride with Barga. 132. Uber failed to provide Plaintiff with a safe ride. SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION: NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 133. Plaintiff alleges and reasserts all of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 134. Uber had no reasonable grounds for believing the false representations it made to Plaintiff regarding safety and reliability of its service were true. Nevertheless, Uber intended that customers including Daniel Minzer rely on its misrepresentations in choosing Uber over other transportation services and options. 135. Plaintiff reasonably relied on Uber’s misrepresentations in riding with Barga, and his reliance on Uber’s misrepresentations were a substantial factor in causing his harm. If Plaintiff had known all the facts Uber concealed about its service, its security screening, and its drivers, he would not have accepted a ride with Barga. Uber failed to provide Plaintiff with a safe ride. 16 17 of 20 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 02/22/2019 05:02 PM INDEX NO. 151979/2019 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/22/2019 SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION: BREACH OF CONTRACT 136. Plaintiff alleges and reasserts all of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 137.
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JAMES PARKER, AN INDIVIDUAL VS LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, A PUBLIC ENTITY, ET AL.
Aug 13, 2024 |22STCV11018
Case Number: 22STCV11018 Hearing Date: August 13, 2024 Dept: W JAMES PARKER V. LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, et al. DEFENDANT LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITYS MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENSE NUEROLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF PLAINTIFF JAMES PARKER Date of Hearing: August 13, 2024 Trial Date: None set. Department: W Case No.: 22STCV11018 Moving Party: Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority Responding Party: No opposition. Meet and Confer: Yes. (Cole Decl. ¶6.) BACKGROUND On April 4, 2024, Plaintiff James Parker filed a complaint against Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (LACMTA) and John Doe for motor vehicle negligence and general negligence. Plaintiff alleges in August 2021, while operating his bicycle, a LACMTA bus came into contact with Plaintiff after the LACMTA driver, John Doe, illegally crossed the intersection. [Tentative] Ruling Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authoritys Motion to Compel Defense Neurological Examination of Plaintiff James Parker is GRANTED. discussion Defendant LACMTA moves this court for an order compelling Plaintiff James Parker to appear, without objection, for a defense neurological examination, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.220, at the offices of Edwin Amos, M.D., 2021 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 525E, Santa Monica, CA 90404, on a date and time earliest available to the doctor. Defendant LACMTA also asks this court to impose sanctions on Plaintiff James Parker. Except for defense physicals in personal injury cases (in which one examination is permitted as a matter of course) and exams arranged by stipulation, a court order is required for a physical or mental examination. Such order may be made only after notice and hearing, and for good cause shown. (CCP §2032.320(a).) The examination will be limited to whatever condition is in controversy in the action. (CCP §2032.020(a).) This means the examination must be directly related to the specific injury or condition that is the subject of the litigation. (Roberts v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 330, 337.) Plaintiff previously appeared for a medical examination with Defendants orthopedic expert, Kevin M. Erhardt, M.D. (Cole Decl. ¶4.) Later at Plaintiffs deposition Plaintiff testified to prolonged memory loss. (Cole Decl. ¶5, Exh. B.) Thereafter, the parties agreed for Plaintiff to attend a second defense examination with neurologist Edwin Amos, M.D. for June 11, 2024. (Cole Decl. ¶6, Exhs. D, E.) Plaintiff served no objections and on June 10, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel confirmed that his client would attend the examination as noticed. (Cole Decl. ¶6, Exh. F.) However, Plaintiff failed to appear for the appointment. (Cole Decl. ¶6.) Dr. Amos submitted an invoice for his standard no-show fee of $750.00, which LACMTA has paid. (Cole Decl., ¶6, Exh. G.) LACMTA contacted Plaintiffs counsel advising him on the no show and requested to reschedule the examination. (Cole Decl. ¶6, Exh. H.) However, LACMTA has received no response. (Cole Decl. ¶6.) The court finds good cause to compel the neurological examination of Plaintiff Parker. Mr. Parker has claimed serious neurological injuries. Moreover, Mr. Parker originally agreed to participate in the neurological examination yet chose not to appear. Plaintiff did not file any opposition to the motion or otherwise dispute the injuries claimed have necessitated an additional examination by a neurologist. Accordingly, the Motion to Compel Defense Neurological Examination of Plaintiff James Parker is GRANTED.
Ruling
JOHN DOE, ET AL. VS CHINA OCEAN SHIPPING COMPANY, ET AL.
Aug 13, 2024 |23LBCV01235
Case Number: 23LBCV01235 Hearing Date: August 13, 2024 Dept: S25 Plaintiffs Arthur Quintans, Jr and Krystal Quintans Motion to Compel Defendant Smiths Detection Inc.s Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents (Set One)Legal Standard Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (a), a court may order a party to serve a further response to a request for production of documents when the court finds that: (1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete[;] (2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive[; or] (3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a).) Next, the court shall impose a monetary sanction against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response to demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circ*mstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (h).) A court has discretion to fix the amount of reasonable monetary sanctions. (Cornerstone Realty Advisors, LLC v. Summit Healthcare Reit, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 771.) Discussion Plaintiffs move to compel Defendant SDIs further responses to Requests for Production of Documents (Set One) Nos. 2, 5-7, 15, 19-20 26-27, 36-38, 40-42, 44, and 45. (Moving Papers 3:4-6.) Defendant SDI argues that Plaintiffs Request for Production of Documents (Set Two) renders the above requests moot and that Request for Production, Set Two, seeks all documents pertaining to four different HCVM devices with specific identification numbers and SDI has produced responsive documents to these requests. (Opposing Papers 8:1-4.) Defendant has not attached a copy of its responses to Request for Production of Document (Set Two) and Plaintiffs have not mentioned it in the instant motion filed on July 18, 2024. No reply has been filed by Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Court will address Requests for Production of Documents (Set One) Nos. 2, 5-7, 15, 19-20, 26-27, 36-38, 40-42, 44, and 45. Request for Production No. 2 asks for all documents pertaining to Defendant SDIs corporate history and structure. The Court DENIES this request as unduly burdensome and overly broad. To ask for all documents pertaining to Defendant SDIs corporate history and structure is too all-encompassing for Plaintiffs purpose of seeking to ensure they have the correct entities and are aware of other related entities that may impact the case. Request for Production Nos. 5 and 6 ask for all documents pertaining to efforts to determine health hazards from and protect Defendant SDIs employees from radiation. The Court DENIES these requests as unduly burdensome, irrelevant, vague and ambiguous and overly broad as to time and scope. Moreover, these requests likely seek documents protected by attorney-client privilege and attorney work product doctrine. Request for Production No. 7 asks for all documents pertaining to membership in industry or trade organizations containing other entities manufacturing radiation-containing equipment or radioactive equipment. This request is irrelevant, unduly burdensome and overly broad. The Court DENIES this request. Request for Production No. 15 asks for all documents related to Defendant SDIs HCVM X-ray screening system sold, delivered to or supplied to Port of Long Beach. To the extent that Defendant SDI has provided responses to Plaintiffs Requests for Production of Documents (Set Two) which identified the specific HCVM units and produced documents related to them, the Court finds this request moot. Request for Production No. 19 asks for all documents pertaining to patents or patent applications for any of Defendant SDIs HCVM X-ray screening system. The Court DENIES this request as it is overly broad, unduly burdensome, seeks documents protected by attorney client privilege, attorney work product doctrine and requests documents reflecting trade secrets, proprietary and confidential information of Defendant SDI. Request for Production No. 20 asks for all documents pertaining to entities purchased or otherwise acquired radiation sources for the HCVM X-ray screening system and/or components from Defendant SDIs inception to present. The Court finds the request ambiguous and vague as to radiation sources. Moreover, it is unduly burdensome and overly broad as to HCVM X-ray screen system without specifying the specific type produced and manufactured by Defendant SDI. The request is DENIED. Request for Production No. 26 asks for all documents pertaining to Defendant SDIs decision to either include or not include warnings with the HCVM X-ray screening system. This request is overly broad as to the type of warnings and is unduly burdensome is Defendant SDI is to produce all documents related to warnings or not including warnings for all types of HCVM X-ray screen systems. The request is DENIED. Request for Production No. 27 seeks written reports or communications from Defendant SDIs insurance carriers regarding radiation. The Court GRANTS this request to the extent that the reports are related to the specific HCVM X-ray screening systems encountered by Plaintiffs and that such documents are not protected by attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product doctrine and does not disclose trade secrets, confidential information and/or proprietary information from Defendant SDI. Request for Production No. 36 asks for the total compensation for the president and/or chief executive officer of each defendant company for the most recently ended fiscal year. The Court DENIES this request as irrelevant, and Defendant SDI has already provided insurance coverage information regarding ability to pay. The Court recognizes that punitive damages may not be covered by insurance coverages and that there is a pending demurrer and motion to strike filed by Defendant SDI partially related to punitive damages. Request for Production No. 37 asks for indemnity agreements of any kind between any defendant company/companies and any other entity/entities. The Court DENIES this request as irrelevant, and Defendant SDI has already provided insurance coverage information regarding ability to pay. The Court recognizes that punitive damages may not be covered by insurance coverages and that there is a pending demurrer and motion to strike filed by Defendant SDI partially related to punitive damages. Request for Production No. 38 asks for all documents identifying reserves for any liabilities covering this claim by defendant and its affiliates, parent corporations, holding companies or subsidiaries. The Court DENIES this request as irrelevant, and Defendant SDI has already provided insurance coverage information regarding ability to pay. The Court recognizes that punitive damages may not be covered by insurance coverages and that there is a pending demurrer and motion to strike filed by Defendant SDI partially related to punitive damages. Request for Production No. 40 asks for any documents evidencing insurance coverage and the amount of coverage for this action. The Court DENIES this request as Defendant SDI has already provided its relevant insurance coverage information. Request for Production No. 41 asks for all documents referencing the message from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency representatives regarding hazardous quantities of radiation associated with the HCVM X-ray screening system. The request is DENIED because it is ambiguous as to message. It is also overly broad and unduly burdensome as to message and HCVM X-ray screening system. Moreover, it is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Plaintiffs have not elaborated what communication or message was sent or received regarding hazardous quantities of radiation associated with the HCVM X-ray screening system; indeed, no specific allegation of such a communication or message is specifically pleaded in the complaint. Request for Production No. 42 seeks all documents referencing communication from National Treasury Employees Union including, but not limited to Paul Sumbi on December 1, 2014 regarding hazardous quantities of radiation associated with the HCVM X-ray screening system. The request is DENIED because the request is ambiguous as to communication. It is also overly broad and unduly burdensome as to communication and HCVM X-ray screening system. Moreover, it is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Plaintiffs have not elaborated what communication or message was sent or received regarding hazardous quantities of radiation associated with the HCVM X-ray screening system; indeed, no specific allegation of such a communication or message is specifically pleaded in the complaint. Request for Production No. 44 asks for all documents regarding maintenance or other services Defendant SDI performed on HCVM X-ray screening units for customers generally. The Court DENIES this request as overly broad, unduly burdensome and vague and ambiguous as to maintenance or other services. The request is also unduly burdensome and overly broad as to customers. Request for Production No.45 asks for all documents regarding maintenance or other services Defendant SDI performed on HCVM X-ray screening units for CBP specifically. The Court DENIES this request as overly broad, unduly burdensome and vague and ambiguous as to maintenance or other services. Plaintiffs request sanctions in the amount of $2,400.00 for work performed in this matter. If sanctions are sought, Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.040 requires that the notice specify the identity of the person against whom sanctions are sought and the type of sanction requested, that the motion be supported in the points and authorities, and the facts be set forth in a declaration supporting the amount of any monetary sanction. The instant motion does not contain a declaration setting forth a breakdown of costs and attorneys fees for sanctions. No explanation as to how Plaintiffs came up with the amount of $2,400.00 in monetary sanctions has been provided. Plaintiffs request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.Plaintiffs Arthur Quintans, Jr and Krystal Quintans Motion to Compel Defendant Smiths Detection Inc.s Further Responses to Special Interrogatories (Set One) Legal Standard Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (a), a court may order a party to serve a further response to an interrogatory when the court finds that: (1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete[;] (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate[; or] (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).) The burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure to fully answer the interrogatories. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.) Next, the court shall impose a monetary sanction against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circ*mstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (d).) A court has discretion to fix the amount of reasonable monetary sanctions. (Cornerstone Realty Advisors, LLC v. Summit Healthcare Reit, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 771.) Discussion Plaintiffs move to compel Defendant SDIs further responses to Special Interrogatory Nos. 4-7, 9, 15-16, and 20-25. (Moving Papers 3:4-5.) Defendant SDI argues that it has provided supplemental verified responses to Special Interrogatory Nos. 20-22 and 25, thereby rendering them moot. Plaintiffs contend that Defendant SDI did not supplement their responses to Special Interrogatory Nos. 20-22, 25, when Defendant SDI provided its supplemental responses on August 1, 2024. Plaintiffs assert that Defendant SDI only provided supplemental verified responses to Special Interrogatory Nos. 2, 4, 6 and 8. Plaintiffs maintain these supplemental responses are not clear. (Reply Papers, Ex. A.) Plaintiffs have withdrawn Special Interrogatories Nos. 23 and 24 but maintain that Defendant SDIs responses to Special Interrogatories Nos. 4-7, 9, 15, 16, 20-22 and 25 remain insufficient. It is unknown whether Defendant SDI has now provided the promised supplemental verified responses to Special Interrogatories Nos. 20-22. As to Special Interrogatory No. 25, it is unknown whether Defendant SDI has now provided the promised supplemental verified response confirming it conducted a reasonable inquiry and diligent search but was unable to find any responsive information. Accordingly, the Court will only address Special Interrogatory Nos. 4-7, 9, 15, 16, 20-22 and 25. Special Interrogatory Nos. 4-7, 15, 16 request that Defendant SDI to provide facts pertaining to its sale, supply and/or marketing of the HCVM X-ray screen system to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, SoFi Stadium, Rose Bowl, Port of Long Beach as well as maintenance performed on the HCVM X-ray screening system purchased by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency annually as well as for other customers. The Court finds that the requests are overly broad and unduly burdensome to the extent that Plaintiffs fail to specify which specific type of HCVM unit that allegedly exposed him to radiation and there is no time limit on the scope of Plaintiffs request. Special Interrogatory No. 9 asks Defendant SDI to describe the search it conducted for documents responsive to Plaintiffs Requests for Production (Set One). Defendant SDI argues it has already informed Plaintiffs that Defendant SDI conducted a reasonable and diligent search and that is all that required under California law. Plaintiffs counter that Defendant SDI needs to provide the detailed information that is the basis of Defendant SDIs representation that they did conduct a reasonable inquiry and diligent search for documents. Plaintiffs have not provided any legal authority in support of their proposition that Defendant SDI must provide a description of its search for documents responsive to Plaintiffs Requests for Production (Set One). Thus, the Court finds Plaintiffs are not entitled to a further response to Special Interrogatory No. 9. Special Interrogatories Nos. 20 and 21 seek identification of all persons to whom Defendant SDI or its employees received a communication from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency or forwarded a communication from the U.S. Custom and Border Protection Agency representatives regarding hazardous quantities of radiation associated with the HCVM X-ray screening system. The requests are DENIED because the Special Interrogatories are ambiguous as to communication. They are also overly broad and unduly burdensome as to communication and HCVM X-ray screening system. Moreover, it is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Plaintiffs have not elaborated what communication or message was sent or received regarding hazardous quantities of radiation associated with the HCVM X-ray screening system; indeed, no specific allegation of such a communication or message is specifically pleaded in the complaint. Special Interrogatory No. 22 seeks responses taken by Defendant SDI in response to the message from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency representatives regarding hazardous quantities of radiation associated with the HCVM X-ray screening system. The request is DENIED because the Special Interrogatory is ambiguous as to message. It is also overly broad and unduly burdensome as to message and HCVM X-ray screening system. Moreover, it is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Plaintiffs have not elaborated what communication or message was sent or received regarding hazardous quantities of radiation associated with the HCVM X-ray screening system; indeed, no specific allegation of such a communication or message is specifically pleaded in the complaint. Special Interrogatory No. 25 asks for the identification of all persons to whom Defendant SDI or its employees forwarded the communication from National Treasury Employees Union including, but not limited to Paul Sumbi on December 1, 2014 regarding hazardous quantities of radiation associated with the HCVM X-ray screening system. Plaintiffs are not entitled to a further response as to Special Interrogatory No. 25. The requests are DENIED because the Special Interrogatory is ambiguous as to communication. They are also overly broad and unduly burdensome as to communication and HCVM X-ray screening system. Moreover, it is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Plaintiffs have not elaborated what communication or message was sent or received regarding hazardous quantities of radiation associated with the HCVM X-ray screening system; indeed, no specific allegation of such a communication or message is specifically pleaded in the complaint. Plaintiffs request for further response to Special Interrogatory No. 25 is DENIED. Plaintiffs request for monetary sanctions in the amount of $2,400 is DENIED.
Ruling
JILING HUANG ET AL VS. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. ET AL
Aug 12, 2024 |CGC23610835
Matter on the Law & Motion calendar for Monday, August 12, 2024, Line 7. PLAINTIFF JILING HUANG, XIAORU ZANG AND THE ESTATE OF LIUXUAN HUANG's Motion For Leave To File First Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for leave to file first amended complaint is granted. For the 9:30 a.m. Law & Motion calendar, all attorneys and parties may appear in Department 302 remotely. Remote hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. Counsel for the prevailing party is required to prepare a proposed order which repeats verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling and must email it to contestdept302tr@sftc.org prior to the hearing even if the tentative ruling is not contested. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/RBU)
Ruling
Haynes vs. Oasis Fun Center, Inc.
Aug 14, 2024 |23CV-0203093
HAYNES VS. OASIS FUN CENTER, INC.Case Number: 23CV-0203093This matter is on calendar for review regarding trial setting. The previous trial date was vacated by the Court’sorder dated May 21, 2024. The Court designates this matter as a Plan II case and intends to set the matter for trialno later than February 25, 2025. Both sides have posted jury fees. The parties are ordered to meet and conferregarding trial dates and to appear to provide the Court with available trial dates.
Ruling
CHRISTIAN FRANK STEVENS VS JOHN DOE
Aug 13, 2024 |Renee C. Reyna |23STCV04327
Case Number: 23STCV04327 Hearing Date: August 13, 2024 Dept: 29 Stevens v. Doe 23STCV04327 Motion to be Relieved as Counsel, filed by Plaintiffs Counsel Astghik Ghevondyan, Esq. Tentative The motion is granted. Background On February 28, 2023, Chirstian Frank Stevens (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against John Doe and Does 1 to 50 for motor vehicle negligence and general negligence arising out of accident occurring on March 1, 2021. No defendant has appeared. On May 21, 2024, Astghik Ghevondyan, Esq. (Counsel) filed this motion to be relieved as counsel. No opposition has been filed. The hearing was initially set for July 8 and was continued by the Court.. Legal Standard The court may order that an attorney be changed or substituted at any time before or after judgment or final determination upon request by either client or attorney and after notice from one to the other. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 284(b).) An attorney is permitted to withdraw where conflicts between the attorney and client make it unreasonable to continue the representation. (See Cal. Rules of Prof. Conduct 3-700(C)(1).) The determination whether to grant or deny a motion to withdraw as counsel lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. (Manfredi & Levine v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1133.) An application to be relieved as counsel must be made on Judicial Counsel Form MC-051 (Notice of Motion and Motion) (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(a)), MC-052 (Declaration) (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.136(c)), and MC-053 (Proposed Order) (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(e)). Further, the requisite forms must be served on the client and all other parties who have appeared in the case. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(d).) The court may delay effective date of the order relieving counsel until proof of service of a copy of the signed order on the client has been filed with the court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(e).) Discussion Counsel has filed the Notice, Declaration, and Order to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff. All substantive and procedural requirements are satisfied. For good cause shown, the motion is granted. Conclusion The Court GRANTS the motion to be relieved as counsel. The order is effective on the filing with the Court of a proof of service showing service of the signed order (not just the minute order) on the client. Moving counsel to give notice.
Ruling
CORNELIUS MURPHY ET AL VS. 3M COMPANY ET AL
Aug 13, 2024 |CGC23277169
(Part 2 of 2) (Tentative ruling continued from previous entry.) 9. A further case management conference is set for October 15, 2024, at 1:30 p.m. a. Case management conference statements are not required. b. Parties may appear at the conference by zoom. c. If the parties agree that no CMC is necessary, they shall notify the Court at least two court days before the hearing. 10. Plaintiffs will send a settlement demand to Defendants no later than October 21, 2024. Response to the settlement demand is due November 5, 2024. The parties shall separately submit confidential settlement demands/offers. This confidential value must be separately submitted to Department503@sftc.org via electronic mail on November 12, 2024. 11. A mandatory settlement conference is set for Thursday, November 21, 2024, at 9:30 a.m. in Department 503. Personal appearance is required by all unless a party is excused for good cause. A request to excuse a personal appearance must be submitted to Department503@sftc.org two weeks before the mandatory settlement conference. The prevailing party shall lodge with the clerk in Department 301 by the time set for this hearing a proposed order repeating verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling. Any party wishing to contest the tentative ruling must email contestasbestostr@sftc.org by 4:00 p.m. on the day before the hearing and state their intention to contest. If a hearing is requested, it will be on August 13, 2024 at 9:30 a.m. Attorneys may appear in person or remotely. Face coverings are optional. Remote appearances must be arranged through CourtCall (1-888-88-COURT). No prior notice or permission is required. If a party wishes to have the matter reported, the parties must meet and confer to agree on only one court reporter, who must be licensed under Bus. & Prof. Code, sec. 8016. There will be only one official record. If the parties cannot agree, the Court will designate a qualified court reporter to provide the official transcript for the matter, and the party or parties will bear the cost. = (301/RCE)
Ruling
PATRICK ORLANDO DONALD VS LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY
Aug 14, 2024 |24STCV09114
Case Number: 24STCV09114 Hearing Date: August 14, 2024 Dept: 68 Dept. 68 Date: 8-14-24 Case: 24STCV09114 Trial Date: Not Set RELIEVED AS COUNSEL OF RECORD MOVING ATTORNEY: Joshua Kohanim CLIENT: Plaintiff, Patrick Donald RELIEF REQUESTED Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel of Record SUMMARY OF ACTION On April 11, 2024, Plaintiff Patrick Donald filed a form complaint for motor vehicle and negligence arising from Plaintiff entering a bus operated by Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Authority (LACMTA), and said bus proceeding without notice thereby causing severe injruies. LACMTA answered the complaint on May 14, 2024. RULING: Denied. Counsel for Plaintiff Patrick Donald moves to be relieved as counsel of record, due to an irremediable breakdown in the attorney client relationship that stands in the way of effective representation. Although the motion complies with all procedural requirements, the motion was only served on Plaintiff, and not on Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Authority (LACMTA). LACMTA answered on May 14, 2024, and the instant motion was filed on May 31, 2024, thereby entitling LACMTA to notice of all proceedings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1014.) Case Management Conference set for September 18, 2024. Moving attorney to provide notice to all parties.
Document
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Marcus Forman As Administrator of the Estate of Michael Forman, deceased v. Scott Weber ,M.D., Concorde Medical Group, Northwell Health And, Vanguard Gastroenterology
Feb 03, 2023 |John J. Kelley |Torts - Medical, Dental, or Podiatrist Malpractice |Torts - Medical, Dental, or Podiatrist Malpractice |805041/2023
